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What happens when an observer takes an agent’s visual perspective of a scene? We 
conducted a series of experiments designed to measure what proportion of adults take a 
stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered approach to a visual perspective taking task. 
Adults were presented with images of an agent looking at a number (69). From the 
perspective of the viewer, the number appeared upside down. We then asked participants 
what number the agent saw. An agent-centered approach, i.e., one that takes into account the 
other’s visual experience, should produce the correct answer '69'. Even an egocentric error 
(i.e., the participant's own perspective) would provide the same correct response. We were 
interested in what proportion of participants would give the incorrect answer '96', which is 
best explained by a stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered strategy, namely 'flipping' 
each digit one at a time from left to right. Crucially, such a strategy ignores the alternative 
visual perspective. We found that, on average, 12-21% of participants made this error. We 
discuss this finding in the context of the key questions around representation, content, and 













Visual perspective taking (VPT) concerns the ability to represent and/or make 
judgments about the viewpoint of another person, and it is often central to successful 
communication and interaction with others (Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 
2008; Clark & Brennan, 1991; Linde & Labov, 1975). Despite decades of research going 
back at least as far as Piaget (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956), there is currently no formal model or 
theory of VPT (Cole & Millett, 2019). A crucial issue for any such model is the question of 
what aspects of a viewpoint an observer can reliably represent (Cole, Millett, Samuel, & 
Eacott, 2020). Consistent with what might be called an 'intuitive' view of VPT, some scholars 
have suggested that it is possible to simulate the visual experiences of others in quasi-
perceptual, image-like form (Ward, Ganis, & Bach, 2019; Ward, Ganis, McDonough, & 
Bach, 2020). Others have suggested such representations are theoretically problematic (Cole 
& Millett, 2019; Cole et al., 2020), and that perspective-takers bring naive and often 
erroneous concepts of how vision works to bear on VPT problems (Samuel, Hagspiel, Eacott, 
& Cole, 2021). Some have broken the problem up by proposing two systems, one which 
spontaneously captures ('registers') simple visual links between agents and objects, and one 
which is effortful but can generate a richer, more detailed representation of appearance 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). 
An equally important but rarely-asked question is how frequently observers need to 
represent other visual perspectives in VPT. For instance, it has been demonstrated that some 
VPT problems can be solved by drawing imaginary lines from agents' eyes to objects, 
concluding that something is not seen if objects lie in their paths (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). 
Other VPT tasks might be tackled by relating target objects to the agent in the form of simple 
spatial propositions such as 'in front of', a process called object-centered spatial coding 
(Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird, & Heyes, 2015). The ability to reverse spatial mappings for 
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someone in front of us can also solve certain VPT problems concerning the left/right axis (Yu 
& Zacks, 2017). Importantly, none of these strategies would conform with a reasonable 
definition of a representing another agent's visual experience (see Cole et al., 2020). 
One possibility is that the strategies described above occur because the tasks are too 
simple to necessitate a representation of another agent's vision; they concern the relatively 
basic question of what is visible, not how things appear, usually defined as Level 1 and Level 
2 perspective problems respectively (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay et 
al., 1974). A representation of visual experience should be more likely (and resistant to short-
cut heuristics) when the stimulus appears different according to perspective, such as a 6 and a 
9 (see Lurz, 2009, for an interesting discussion of this point in relation to comparative 
cognition). However, even in Level 2 VPT tasks it has been shown that adults sometimes 
apply strategies that misrepresent what an agent sees. For example, when viewing an agent 
looking at two lines of equal length but where one line is closer to the agent than the other, 
observers are as likely to judge the closer line to appear visually shorter to the agent as 
longer, despite this response contradicting not only the agent's perspective, but also geometric 
logic (Samuel et al., 2021). The explanation offered for this effect was that, rather than 
attempt to represent what the agent saw, participants applied an (erroneous) folk theory of 
how vision works. One such theory could be the belief that, since the two lines were in fact 
the same length, the more distant one is somehow visually 'stretched' to compensate for this 
knowledge. Results like these suggest that, even in Level 2 tasks, VPT need not elicit a 
representation of another agent's visual experience.  
Results such as these also suggest that a closer examination of errors in VPT could 
provide useful information about how people approach VPT problems. However, tasks which 
are designed to measure accuracy or response times typically do not allow clear inferences 
about pathways to errors to be made. For example, even in the experiment with the identical 
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lines described above (Samuel et al., 2021), it is possible that participants had generated 
something that they thought was a representation of another agent's vision, even when this 
was inaccurate. In these circumstances it is difficult to know whether such an error should 
still be considered a 'representation', because the result fails to reflect the agent's experience. 
Part of the problem therefore also concerns how one defines a representation in the context of 
VPT.  
We consider that, minimally, such a representation should be agent-centered. In 
essence, this is the consideration of the stimuli in terms of the perception of them. Such a 
representation need not be true (i.e., it need not be accurate) to be a representation. An agent-
centered strategy fits neatly with the argument that VPT is a component of the ability to 
understand others’ mental states (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Ferguson, Apperly, & 
Cane, 2017), namely our Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This contrasts with a 
stimulus-centered approach, in which an operation is performed on the stimuli in the belief 
that this will lead (indirectly) to a correct judgment about a perspective. This strategy is more 
difficult to identify with Theory of Mind, as the agent’s visual experience does not have 
primacy. Applying this contrast to the experiment where an agent sees two identical lines but 
one is closer, some errors (judgments that the closer line looked shorter) may have arisen 
because participants formed a 'bad' representation but one that nevertheless was conceived of 
as a corresponding to the agent's perceptual experience. These errors would thus achieve 
minimal qualification as representations, by our definition. Others may have applied one or 
other erroneous rule sourced in a consideration of the stimuli themselves, such as the 
'stretching' of the further line already described, or the application of an erroneous 
geometrical rule (closer things appear smaller). These approaches would instead be stimulus-
centered. Note that we cannot know whether even correct responses were agent- or stimulus-
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centered; they may have come about via a 'good' representation or a correct application of the 
geometric rule 'closer things appear larger'. 
Ideally, therefore, it would be possible to know precisely how an observer arrived at a 
response. We therefore designed a paradigm in which one type of error would be best 
explicable in terms of a stimulus-centered approach. Participants were presented with a 
picture of a woman looking at a number. The woman's position meant that the number 
appeared upside-down, compared to the participant's viewpoint. When that number was a 6 
from the participant’s perspective, the answer to a question about what number the agent saw 
was therefore ‘9’. This answer could be arrived at either by representing the agent’s visual 
perspective of the number (agent-centered) or by ‘flipping’ the number upside-down 
(stimulus-centered), meaning the response alone could not distinguish between these two 
strategies. This required a number that would generate a different response depending on 
strategy. An example of such a number is 69. The number ‘69’ looks the same upside-down, 
and thus it is also 69 from the agent’s perspective. Now the agent-centered and stimulus-
centered approached could be distinguished, because only the latter can produce the error 
‘96’. The question was, what proportion of participants would take the stimulus-centered 
route to solving a Level 2 VPT problem and therefore make this error? The outcome would 
serve as a measure of the frequency and therefore the importance of stimulus-centered rather 
than agent-centered, representational VPT. 
 
2. All Experiments 
2.1 General method 
The experiment was performed online using Qualtrics. Participants were told at the 
start that they should maximize their browser window and switch off their phone/email/music 
and anything else distracting. They were told that the experiment was investigating people's 
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ability to accurately recall details of photos, and that they would be asked to view some 
images and answer questions about aspects of those images. After providing informed 
consent, participants entered information about their age, gender, and whether they were 
native English speakers. They were then told that they would be shown a photo (4002 pixels, 
see Figure 1) and were instructed that they should pay attention to the photo for as long as it 
appeared. Participants always saw two images, one per trial. Each photo depicted a woman 
sitting down looking at a number on the floor. The precise question that participants were 
asked, when they responded, and whether they had their attention directed towards the agent, 
varied by experiment. Participants were then debriefed and the experiment ended. Total 
experiment time was approximately 2-4 minutes. An entirely new sample was recruited for 
each experiment. 
 
3. Experiment 1  
In Experiment 1, participants were informed that they would be shown images of an 
agent looking at a number. Each image appeared for three seconds before disappearing. 
When the image disappeared, participants were presented with a text box and were instructed 
as follows: "Please type the number the woman saw". Up to ten seconds were allowed to 
respond. In the first trial ('Trial 1') the participant saw a '6' which from the agent’s perspective 
appeared to be a '9'. The correct response was thus '9'. Results from this trial would tell us 
whether participants were able to take the agent's perspective of the number, but not how they 
did so. It would also induct participants into the knowledge that what they see as a 6 is a 9 
when viewed upside down, which could encourage the use of this information in a stimulus-
centered response later. This was examined in the second trial ('Trial 2'). In this trial the 
participant saw '69', the same number that the agent saw. If participants successfully 
represented the agent's perspective, they should give the answer '69'. Note that giving the 
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correct answer does not guarantee that participants generated a representation, because the 
same response would be given if participants rotated the digits while maintaining their own 
frame of reference. A '69' response would also be given even if participants ignored the 
agent's perspective entirely and simply gave what they themselves saw (an egocentric error). 
However, a stimulus-centered strategy would be to 'flip' (invert) the digits individually 
according to the rule: 'a 6 looks like a 9/a 9 looks like a 6'.  If participants use this strategy 
rather than attempting to consider the agent's perception, they will produce the erroneous 
response '96'. Note that no-one saw '96' - this response is best explained in terms of a 
stimulus-centered strategy of number-flipping. We could therefore be confident that any such 
errors came from participants who had not taken an agent-centered approach. 
 We were interested in the proportion of '96' responses rather than statistical analyses 
of '69' vs. '96' responses because, while the best explanation for a '96' response is clearly a 
stimulus-centred response, correct '69' responses can be arrived at via distinct strategies, 
meaning a comparison would not tell us anything interesting about the relative frequencies of 
different VPT strategies (or indeed an absence of strategy, in the case of fortuitously correct 




 Examining proportions (Trial 2) comes with no specific strategy for generating a 
sample size. We therefore chose to conduct a power analysis based on Trial 1, where 
participants were shown a single number ('6') and asked what the agent saw. This test was 
conducted in G*Power (version 3.1.9.5), and was based on a one-sample and one-tailed 
(V0/V1 of 1.5) chi square test with an alpha of .05 and power of .80. The test resulted in a 
desired N of 74. We chose a one-tailed test because we expected participants to be more 
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accurate than not on Trial 1. Adults consistently show above-chance accuracy (approx. 80% 
and higher) when taking others' perspectives of single digits, including when the angle of 
perspective is 180 degrees (Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013a, 2013b; Surtees, Butterfill, & 
Apperly, 2012), and even when there is a second, distractor digit (Samuel, Cole, & Eacott, 
2020; Samuel, Legg, Manchester, Lurz, & Clayton, 2019). The reported tests, however, come 
from two-tailed tests of significance for conservatism. 
We recruited participants using Prolific Academic, requiring that they used a laptop or 
desktop computer (which could not be easily physically re-oriented), were aged 18-35, and 
spoke English as a first language. We recruited the suggested 74 participants (MAge = 28, 
range 18-34, 1 non-binary, 27 male, 46 female). Ethical approval for the study was received 
from the University of Essex Psychology Ethics Committee. All participants were 
compensated equally for their time. 
 
 





3.2 Results and Discussion 
Trial 1. Of the 74 participants, 42 (56.8%) correctly stated that the woman saw '9', 32 
(43.2%) did not, with all but one of these saying she saw the same number they saw ('6'), the 
exception giving a '2' response. This difference was not statistically significant, Chi Sq (1,74) 
= 1.351, p = .245. 
Trial 2. Of the 74 participants, 65 (87.8%) correctly gave a '69' response, and 9 
(12.2%) stated that the woman saw '96', a number that no-one saw. This suggests that these 
participants 'flipped' each of the two digits in a left-right sequence, a stimulus-centered 
approach1. Of these nine participants, the majority (seven participants or 78%) had provided 
an accurate response on Trial 1, and had therefore previously responded that what looked like 
a 6 to themselves looked like a 9 to the agent. Two (22%) had previously provided an 
egocentric error (‘6’) on Trial 1. 
 
1 We did not pre-register any statistical analyses of the results of Trial 2, only the reporting of 
proportions. However, for completeness the results of Trial 2 were as follows, always favouring a 
minority of '96' responses: Experiment 1: Chi Sq (1,74) = 42.378, p < .001; Experiment 2: Chi Sq 
(1,74) = 28.595, p < .001; Experiment 3: Chi Sq (1,76) = 25.474, p < .001; Experiment 4: Chi Sq 
(1,74) = 70.054, p < .001. Similarly, we did not pre-register analyses of the conditional probabilities 
of providing a 'flipped' response on Trial Two following either a correct or incorrect response on Trial 
One. Please note that these tests are based on very small sample sizes and should therefore be 
interpreted with caution. These were: Experiment 1: Chi Sq (1,9) = 2.778, p = .1; Experiment 2: Chi 
Sq (1,14) = 10.286, p = .014 (please see the relevant results sections for descriptives). In Experiments 




In sum, 12.2% of participants demonstrated a stimulus-centered approach, 'flipping' 
the digits on Trial 2 rather than considering any true perspective of the stimulus. This 
proportion puts those participants who did this in a clear minority. Unexpectedly, on Trial 1 
participants were about as likely to indicate what they saw (a '6') as they were to provide the 
correct '9' response. This suggests that even taking someone's perspective of a single digit 
was difficult. However, we cannot know whether the incorrect responses on Trial 1 are 
absences of representations or simply bad representations.  
In a second experiment, we changed the question for Trial 1 so that participants were 
now asked to give their own perspective of the number ('6'). This was done for two reasons. 
Firstly, it allowed us to assess whether the stimulus-centered strategy found in Trial 2 
required the induction to the invertibility of 6/9 on Trial 1, which was suggested by the fact 
that only two participants who gave incorrect responses on Trial 1 went on to give a stimulus-
centered response on Trial 2. In other words, would participants use the stimulus-centered 
approach as a ‘starting strategy’, the first time they are asked to take another perspective? 
Secondly, a correct response on Trial 1would also demonstrate that the difficulty of giving 
the correct response in Experiment 1was not simply due to forgetting the number in the 
picture. In addition, in an exploratory test of the data from Experiment 1 we counted the 
number of '96' responses by gender, with four given by males, four by females, and one by a 
non-binary individual. Since males comprised a smaller proportion of the sample, these 
figures corresponded to 15% of males and 9% of women. There was thus a hint that males 
may have a greater tendency to apply the stimulus-centered strategy. This would be 
consistent with research that finds females are better empathizers and embodiers of 
perspectives generally (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Kessler & Wang, 2012). We therefore recruited 
equivalent numbers of males and females to provide more balanced data on this matter to 
assess whether it was deserving of more formal attention (i.e., confirmatory testing).  
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4. Experiment 2 
Details of the preregistration of Experiment 2 can be found here: https://osf.io/mf9tc. 
Data are available in the supplemental materials. 
 
4.1 Method 
Only two changes were made from Experiment 1. We recruited an equal number of 
males (37) and females (37), Final N = 74, MAge = 27. range 18-35, and we changed the 
question for Trial 1 so that it now said the following: "Please type the number you saw" 
(italics new). Thus, Trial 1 now assessed participants' ability simply to recall the number they 
themselves saw. For Trial 2, the original question ("Please type the number the woman saw") 
was retained, but with added italics to draw attention to the change from Trial 1. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
Trial 1. Of the 74 participants, 65 (87.8%) correctly stated that they had seen a '6', 
and 9 (12.2%) did not, with all but one of these giving the number the woman saw ('9'), the 
exception giving a single '3' response. This difference was statistically significant, Chi Sq 
(1,74) = 42.378, p < .001.  
Trial 2. Of the 74 participants, 14 (18.9%) stated that the woman saw '96', which was 
a number that no-one saw. This again suggests that participants 'flipped' each of the two 
digits in a left-right sequence. Six of these 14 were male, 8 were female. Of these fourteen 
participants, all but one (93%) had provided an accurate (and this time egocentric) response 
on Trial 1. Of the rest, 59 (79.7%) gave a correct '69' response, and one gave an incorrect '6' 
response (1.4%).  
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In Experiment 2 18.9% of participants had 'flipped' the digits on Trial 2 rather than 
considered any true perspective of them, a slightly larger proportion than previously. 
Interestingly, this meant the stimulus-centered strategy was applied even when participants 
were not previously inducted to the invertibility of 6/9 in Trial 1. With a balanced quota of 
males and females, there was no evidence that males preferred the stimulus-centered 
approach; instead, two more females than males made this error. Finally, the high accuracy 
rate on Trial 1 rules out the possibility that participants easily forget the number in the image, 
and therefore failures to respond correctly on Trial 1 in the previous Experiment are more 
likely to be failures of perspective taking rather than failures of recall. 
An interesting outcome of Trial 1 was that a minority of 8 participants (10.8%) gave 
the number that the agent saw instead. This was contrary to the explicit instruction to provide 
the number they themselves saw. This type of error is consistent with evidence from studies 
investigating 'spontaneous' perspective taking, in which an individual's ability to act 
egocentrically is compromised when they are aware of an alternative perspective that 
conflicts with their own (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 
2010). However, most such studies take care not to draw explicit attention to the other agent 
in the scene. In contrast, in our task we state just prior to the presentation of the images that 
what will follow is a photo in which is woman is looking at a number. Our 10.8% might 
therefore have been directed to the agent's perspective by means of this textual prime rather 
than through spontaneous VPT. We tested this possibility in Experiment 3, in which we 
removed reference to the woman and what she was looking at from the text for Trial 1 (Trial 
2 remained the same, as it explicitly concerned the woman’s perspective and thus no response 
could be classed as 'spontaneous' perspective taking). We hypothesized that the proportion of 
participants who gave a '9' response on Trial 1 would decline—numerically rather than 
statistically given the already low numbers—with these references removed. 
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5. Experiment 3 
Details of the preregistration of Experiment 3 can be found here: https://osf.io/8seqt. 
5.1 Method 
Only one change was made from Experiment 2. We removed reference to the agent in 
the photo from the introduction to Trial 1. The Intro now simply read: "Now, you will be 
shown a photo. Please pay attention to the photo for as long as it appears." Trial 2 remained 
unchanged (reference to the agent remained). Due to an error one extra female participant 
was recruited, and we therefore recruited one extra male participant for balance (final N = 76, 
MAge = 25, range 18-35, 38 male, 38 female) 
 
5.2 Results and Discussion 
Trial 1. Of the 76 participants, 73 (96.1%) correctly stated that they had seen a '6', 
and 3 (3.9%) did not, giving the number the woman saw ('9'). This difference was statistically 
significant, Chi Sq (1,76) = 64.474, p < .001. 
Trial 2. Of the 76 participants, 16 (21.1%) stated that the woman saw '96'. Six of 
these were male, 10 were female. All of these had responded correctly (i.e., egocentrically) 
on Trial 1. Of the rest, 57 (75%) gave a correct '69' response, one gave '9', one '6', one '95' 
(1.3% each). 
In Experiment 3, 21.1% of participants demonstrated a stimulus-centered strategy on 
Trial 2 rather than considered any true perspective of them, a slightly larger proportion 
(again) than previously. Additionally, removing references to the agent or her perspective 
from the text led to a decline in responses made from her perspective on Trial 1, down from 
10.8% to a quite negligible 3.9%.  
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Overall, across three experiments the proportion of participants who applied an 
(erroneous) stimulus-centered strategy had ranged from a low of 12.2% (Experiment 1) to a 
high of 21.1% (Experiment 3). In a final experiment, we examined whether this strategy was 
restricted to circumstances where the scene could no longer be viewed when responding. 
Previous research has shown that keeping pictures visible when making responses in VPT 
tasks does not increase accuracy relative to responding after a picture disappears; however, 
the stimuli in question were lines and not alphanumeric stimuli, which have been speculated 
to be processed more easily than abstract shapes (Samuel et al., 2021). In Experiment 4 we 
therefore repeated Experiment 1 but allowed participants to make their responses while 
viewing the images, with no time limits.  
 
6. Experiment 4 
Due to an error, Experiment 4 was not pre-registered. However, the method and 
analyses are consistent with the previous experiments and pre-registrations.  
 
6.1 Method 
Only two changes were made from Experiment 1. First, we recruited equal numbers 
of men and women, as per Experiments 2 and 3. Second, instead of showing the critical 
image for a fixed period of time before the response prompt appeared, this time the response 
box was presented beneath the image, and no time limits were set. The Intro now simply 
read: "Now, you will be shown a photo. In the photo is a woman looking at a number." The 
prompt beneath the image on the next screen was: "Please type the number the woman sees". 
Of the 74 participants, 37 were male, 37 female (MAge = 27, range 18-35). 
 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
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Trial 1. Of the 74 participants, 62 (83.8%) correctly responded that the woman saw a 
'9', and 12 (16.2%) did not, giving the number they saw ('6'). Unlike in Experiment 1, this 
difference was statistically significant, Chi Sq (1,74) = 33.784, p < .001. 
Trial 2. Of the 74 participants, all but one (1.4%) correctly responded that the woman 
saw '69', with the sole (female) exception giving the number-flipped error '96'. This 
participant had responded correctly (i.e., that the agent saw a 9) on Trial 1. 
In Experiment 4 only one participant demonstrated a clearly stimulus-centered 
approach on Trial 2. Additionally, participants were now much more likely to give an 
accurate response to the perspective-taking question in Trial 1 in this Experiment than in 
Experiment 1. Overall, it was much easier to solve these VPT problems accurately when it 
was possible both to view the scenes and respond at leisure.  
 
7. General Discussion 
In Experiment 1, when asked what single digit another agent saw, adults were about 
as likely to respond with the number they themselves saw ('6') as the number the agent saw 
('9'). While we can reasonably surmise that those who were incorrect made an egocentric 
error—we cannot know how those 56% who did answer correctly came to their response. 
They may have generated a representation, applied knowledge that a 6 looks like a 9 when 
upside down, mentally rotated the number 180 degrees while maintaining their own 
perspective of the scene, etc. In Experiments 1-3, when asked about the agent's perspective of 
'69', most participants (between 75%-88%) correctly gave the answer '69'. Again, we cannot 
know how this answer was arrived at, or even if it was a fortuitous egocentric error. 
Crucially, between 12.2%–21.1% responded with '96', which is a number that no-one saw but 
can be explained by a stimulus-centered strategy of 'flipping' the numbers '6' and '9' 
individually. This occurred not only when participants were inducted to the reversibility of 
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the digit (Exp 1) but also when they were considering another perspective for the first time 
(Exps 2-3). This suggests that stimulus-centered strategies are also starting strategies for VPT 
tasks. The data therefore show that between 12.2%–21.1% of adults in these experiments 
derived a response to a VPT task without taking anyone's visual perspective at all (even their 
own). While this is clearly a minority, since it is unclear whether correct responses involved 
representations this cannot be an overestimate, but could be an underestimate. Indeed, 
coupled with the low accuracy (56.8%) on even the first trial in Experiment 1, the data 
suggest that representations might even occur in only a minority of cases on this Level 2 VPT 
task. Less speculatively, these results militate against the possibility that Level 2 VPT 
problems are necessarily tackled using an agent-centered rather than stimulus-centered 
approach. By extension, they also suggest that VPT, even Level 2 VPT, need not engage 
one’s Theory of Mind, and that there is no single, dedicated process for VPT questions 
concerning appearance. 
Nevertheless, these conclusions come with a significant caveat because, in 
Experiment 4, when it was possible to view the image and respond at leisure, the vast 
majority got the answer correct on both trials. Evidence of 'number flipping' fell to a single 
participant out of 74. This points to a potential distinction between VPT based on a scene 
being remembered and VPT based on scene being perceived, with a stimulus-centered 
approach more likely for the former than latter. A good explanation for this distinction is not 
immediately apparent. However, we can rule out two possibilities. Firstly, since the images 
shown to participants were clearly not live scenes, we can exclude an explanation by which it 
might be easier to take 'real-time' perspectives. We can also exclude the possibility that 
participants failed to notice or recall the number. This is because i) participants could key in 
any number they wished but only two responses in the first three (timed) experiments 
included any numbers other than 6 and 9; and ii) the vast majority of participants correctly 
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recalled the precise number they saw when asked in Experiments 2 and 3.  If we consider the 
present data alone, it would thus appear that we are left with two possibilities. First, it might 
be easier to come up with an accurate response to a VPT problem while the agent and the 
target stimulus are viewable. Second, it might be easier to come up with an accurate response 
to a VPT problem when an observer is under no time pressure.  
However, a comparison of these results with those from another, similar study with 
abstract rather than alphanumeric stimuli seems to favour a third possibility. Recall from the 
Introduction that, in a series of previous experiments, participants were presented with an 
agent looking at two identical lines (Samuel et al., 2021). Results showed that adults often 
failed to judge that the closer of two identical lines would appear visually longer to an agent. 
Importantly, accuracy was no better if responses were made when both the agent and stimuli 
were viewable while making a response. This contrast is thus very similar to that between the 
present Experiments 1 and 4, with the exception that there was always a ten-second time limit 
in the other study, which was ample for the task at hand. However, in Experiment 1, Trial 1 
of the present studies, 42% of participants gave an erroneous egocentric response, but in 
Experiment 4 this figure decreased to 16%. Additionally, evidence of stimulus-centered 
strategies in Trial 2 was almost non-existent. The instructions participants were given could 
not explain this difference, as they did not change between experiments. Instead, an 
explanation by which increasing the salience of the agent serves to facilitate perspective 
taking with specifically alphanumeric stimuli is the better candidate. We typically expect 
intentional agents to position themselves where they can comfortably read such characters, 
meaning that agents and characters typically predict each others' orientations. However, we 
do not have the same expectation for lines, shapes and other stimuli which have no intrinsic 
'upright' orientation. We therefore speculate that the viewability of the agent while 
responding in Experiment 4 increased the salience of her positional cue, increasing accuracy 
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and by extension decreasing egocentricity on Trial 1, and all but eliminating the use of 
stimulus-centered strategies on Trial 2.  
It is interesting that the level of egocentricity found in Trial 1, Experiment 1, was 
higher than expected (42%). Although error rates from some VPT tasks with adults have been 
reported around this level (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Samuel et al., 2021; Wardlow, 2013; 
Wu & Keysar, 2007), it is unusual for studies with numbers as stimuli. We have just 
speculated that it is easier for participants to take other agents' perspectives of alphanumeric 
characters than abstract shapes, and thus it may appear that this result runs contrary to this 
hypothesis. There are however a number of reasons why direct comparisons between 
accuracy rates in Experiments 1-3 and accuracy rates in many other tasks in the literature is 
made difficult. Firstly, the agent and stimulus here were almost certainly less salient than in 
most other VPT studies in the literature because they were presented for three seconds alone 
and were inaccessible while responding. This is relatively unusual for VPT tasks, which 
usually test participants while the relevant scene is being viewed (Apperly et al., 2010; 
Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Wardlow, 2013; Wu & Keysar, 2007), with some exceptions 
(Samuel, Frohnwieser, Lurz, & Clayton, 2020; Samuel et al., 2021). Secondly, participants 
did not know what they were going to be asked to do until the picture had disappeared. 
Again, this is different from the majority of explicit VPT tasks, in which participants are 
given prior instructions to take an agent's perspective, and therefore what to attend to. 
Thirdly, participants in our experiments saw a total of two trials, and in Experiments 2 and 3 
only one of these required perspective taking. Other VPT paradigms often employ multiple 
trials (Samuel, Cole, et al., 2020; Samuel et al., 2019; Surtees et al., 2013a, 2013b; Surtees et 
al., 2012). More important for our argument about the importance of salience is therefore the 
internal comparison between Experiments 1 and 4.  
 20
In conclusion, we found that adults sometimes (as a minimum, approx. 12-21% of the 
time) apply a stimulus-centered strategy to a VPT task, one which does not comply with a 
definition of a representation as being agent-centered. However, this finding was limited to 
instances where the agent and stimulus were not visible at the time of responding. When they 
were visible, accuracy was very high and evidence for this strategy almost disappeared. Our 
findings therefore suggest that adults sometimes come up with answers to some VPT 
problems without representing, either accurately or inaccurately, another agent's visual 
perspective. Which problems may depend on task-specific factors such as the salience of the 





Authors’ note: All data are available in the supplemental materials. Materials will be 
published on the OSF. Details of pre-registrations can be found here: https://osf.io/a3hfn 
(Experiment 1); https://osf.io/mf9tc (Experiment 2); https://osf.io/8seqt (Experiment 3). 
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